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POST-JONES: HOW DISTRICT COURTS ARE ANSWERING
THE MYRIAD QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. JONES
Jason D. Medinger*
INTRODUCTION
Much was expected. But in reality, many questions remain. When
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v.
Jones/ the order was heralded as a harbinger of change. 2 This
speculation was fueled in large part by the groundbreaking decision
issued below by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard. 3 That
decision was hailed as "a potentially revolutionary Fourth
Amendment decision,',4 which could usher in "a fundamental

*

1.
2.

3.

4.

Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney for the District
of Maryland; Adjunct Professor, Stevenson University. Emory University School of
Law, J.D.; University of Notre Dame, B.A. Any opinions or points of view expressed
in this article represent those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official
position or policies of the United States Department of Justice. I would like to thank
Tyler Sande and Jonathan Letzring for their helpful comments with earlier drafts of
this article. Finally, I would like to thank Kelly for everything.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
See Adam Cohen, Should the Government Need a Search Warrant to Track Your Car
with GPS?, TIME, July 5, 2011, available at http://www.time.comltime/nation/
article/0,8599,2081372,00.html (noting how the Jones grant "could produce one of the
court's biggest privacy rulings in years"); Jaikumar Vijayan, Supreme Court to Weigh
in on Warrantless GPS Tracking, COMPUTER WORLD (June 28, 2011, 12:09 PM),
http://www.computerworld.comls/article/9217985/Supreme_Court_to_ weigh_ in_on_
warrantless_GPS_tracking (noting how the grant of certiorari held the potential for
"far-reaching privacy implications").
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part sub. nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Lawrence Maynard, a co-defendant
tried alongside Antoine Jones, was the lead appellant in the D.C. Circuit appeal.
However, Maynard did not make any arguments on direct appeal with regard to global
positioning system (GPS) evidence. See id. at 549. Presumably as a result, while the
Supreme Court granted the certiorari petition of Jones, it denied the one filed by
Maynard. Maynard v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010). Thus, the case was
renamed for the sole petitioner, Jones.
Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" Of Fourth Amendment, Holds
GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Aug. 6, 2010,
2 :46 PM), http://www.volokh.coml20 10/08/06/d-c-circuit -introduces-mosaic-theory-
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rethinking of how to apply Fourth Amendment privacy rights in the
21st century."s The reason for this groundswell of enthusiasm was
that the court in Maynard took a novel approach to the Fourth
Amendment: it endorsed what is referred to as the "mosaic theory,"
to hold that obtaining twenty-eight days of global positioning system
(GPS) tracking information without a warrant constituted an
unconstitutional "search" under the Fourth Amendment because,
when the information obtained was aggregated over a period of time,
it impermissibly invaded the defendant's constitutional rights.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear Jones, court
commentators prognosticated that the resulting decision could deliver
a realignment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the area of
advancing technologies, particularly if the Supreme Court were to
embrace the mosaic theory in the Fourth Amendment arena. 6
It was not so. In fact, rather than breaking new constitutional
ground, the majority opinion in Jones reverted back to a propertylaw-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that many believed had
been moth-balled more than forty years ago with the Court's decision
in Katz v. United States. 7 Specifically, the majority opinion in Jones
applied a common law trespass theory, and the Supreme Court

5.

6.

of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search!
(noting
how the D.C. Circuit ruling was novel because it "introduces a new 'mosaic' theory of
the Fourth Amendment").
Charlie Savage, Judges Divided Over RiSing GPS Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
20 I 0, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2010/08114/usI14gps.html?pagewanted
=all; see also Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, III MICH. L.
REv. 311, 314 (2012) (noting how the mosaic theory adopted by Maynard would
constitute "a fundamental challenge to current Fourth Amendment law").
Priscilla J. Smith et aI., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use ofGPS

Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable
121
YALE
L.J.
177,
178-79
(2011),
available
at
Searches,
http://www.yalelawjoumal.orgi 2011/101111smith.htrnl; see also Lyle Denniston,
Argument Preview: High-Tech Policing, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2011, 12:03 AM),
7.

http://www.scotusblog.coml20 11111 largument-preview-high-tech-policing/.
Hon. Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones, Does Katz Still Have Nine
Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 116, 147 (2012) (noting how the majority in Jones
applied a "retro-analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" that resurrected
property-law-focused precedents); see also Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The
Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 325, 326-28
(2012). For an extended discussion of the property-law underpinnings of the Fourth
Amendment, see Nancy Forster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones
Resuscitates Property Law Concepts in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 U.
BALT. L. REv. 445 (2013).
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precedents relying on it, to hold that a search under the Fourth
Amendment occurred when agents installed a GPS device on the
undercarriage of the vehicle Antoine Jones was driving, and then
used the device to monitor the car's movements for a period of
twenty-eight days.8 But after reaching this narrow holding, the Court
declined to consider whether the search was nonetheless reasonable,
or whether some exception to the warrant requirement applied, or
whether it would endorse the novel understanding of the Fourth
Amendment espoused in Maynard. 9 The majority opinion simply
found that a search had occurred and affIrmed the D.C. Circuit's
order reversing and remanding to the district court for further
proceedings. 10
While this holding garnered five votes, the Jones case also
spawned two concurring opinions." In the first concurring opinion,
Justice Sotomayor agreed that, at a minimum, a physical trespass by
the Government to obtain information will result in a search. 12 She
went on to suggest that Katz also still applied, and she expressed a
willingness to expand Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test to
emerging technologies. 13 Additionally, in a nod to the mosaic theory
suggested by Maynard,14 Justice Sotomayor noted her concern about
the potential that the police could utilize new technologies to
aggregate broad swaths of information about a person's movements,
and thereby invade constitutionally-protected privacy interests. IS As
a result of these concerns, she signaled openness to revisiting the
principle that people lose a reasonable expectation of privacy when
information is revealed to third parties, particularly when such
disclosures are required to utilize new technologies. 16
In the second concurring opinion, Justice Alito endorsed the view
that Katz should control, and noted the limited reach of the majority's
trespass-based holding in the face of new technologies. 17 But in his
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Jones, l32 S. Ct. at 947-49.
Id. at 954.
Id.
Id. at 947, 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 955.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), ajJ'd in part sub nom.

15.
16.
17.

Jones, l32 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, 1., concurring).
Id. at 957.
Id. at 959, 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring).

United States v. Jones, l32 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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own nod to the mosaic theory suggested by Maynard, Justice Alito
indicated that, at some point, extended surveillance may transfonn
constitutionally-pennissible conduct into conduct that IS
constitutionally prohibited, absent a warrant. 18
So despite the pre-argument hype, Jones delivered a muted result;
at bottom, all the Justices concurred in the narrow holding that a
Fourth Amendment search occurred on the facts of this case. 19 But
roiling below the surface of this unanimity lie the many questions left
open by the majority opinion and the two concurrences. These
questions can be subdivided into three main categories.
First, what does Jones mean in the context of warrantless GPS
tracking going forward?
Specifically, even if the warrantless
installation of a GPS device constitutes a search, could it nonetheless
still be considered "reasonable" under certain circumstances, and
hence permissible under the Fourth Amendment?2o Even if the
warrantless use of GPS tracking is an unreasonable search, do any
exceptions to the warrant requirement apply? Do traditional Fourth
Amendment standing requirements still apply to GPS-related
evidence? Finally, does Jones apply retroactively to cases on direct
appeal or collateral review?
The second category of questions raised by Jones concerns what
implications the decision may have for other modem technologies.
Does the property-law-based theory of Fourth Amendment searches
extend beyond the context of GPS tracking into, for example, emails, cell phone communications, text messages, or social media
po stings? Relatedly, does the third-party disclosure doctrine still
control where these media are concerned?
Third, Jones raises fundamental questions about Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the face of emerging technologies.
Specifically, is the combined property-law-based test and Katz test
approach endorsed by the majority sufficient to protect individual
privacy in this modem age? Must the legislature take the lead in
regulating police conduct in this area?

18.

19.

20.

Jd. at 964.
Id. at 949 (majority opinion) (holding that there was a search); id. at 954 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (concurring that a search occurred); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)
(agreeing that a search occurred).
See id. at 954 (declining to consider whether the search was reasonable because the
argument had been forfeited).
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Because Jones raises these questions but leaves them unanswered,
the onus now falls to district courts to fill some of the void. Since
Jones was decided, lower courts are deciding many of these issues in
the first instance, with interesting results. 21 Specifically, rather than
breaking wholly new constitutional ground, district courts are relying
on long-established precedents in a manner that largely preserves
much of the status quO. 22 For example, while the Supreme Court held
in Jones that GPS tracking constituted a search, lower courts have
avoided excluding such evidence by holding that such a search could
be nonetheless reasonable if it is limited,23 or by holding that an
exception to the warrant requirement applies/4 or by holding that
such evidence falls within the third-party disclosure doctrine. 25 In
short, while Jones was hailed as being a potentially watershed
moment in Fourth Amendment history, district courts applying its
holding have reacted with caution and proceeded in a manner that
does not upset long-established understandings of the Fourth
Amendment. 26
This article is focused on how district courts are addressing the
myriad questions raised by Jones. To set the stage for understanding
the context in which these decisions are being made, Part I of this
article includes a brief overview of the history of the Fourth
Amendment and the relevant decisions leading up to Jones. Part II
provides a brief explication of the holding in Jones, and examines the
questions raised by the majority opinion and the concurrences.
Finally, Part III examines how the district courts are dealing with the
questions created-and left unanswered-by Jones, and suggests
how these questions can be answered in light of prior precedent and
amidst emerging and evolving technologies.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part lILA-B.
See infra Part III.A-B.
See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I1I.A.
See infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
See infra Part lILA-B.
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MAPPING 27 THE PAST: RECOUNTING THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

I.

The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 28
When the Court in Jones construed this proVISIon, it had at its
disposal a long, and admittedly sometimes inconsistent,29 line of
precedents to consider. Because Jones proved correct the maxim that
past is prologue,30 it is helpful to trace briefly the history of the
Fourth Amendment,31 with an eye toward the important developments
that shaped how the Court viewed its application to warrantless
tracking methods.

27.

28.
29.

30.

31.

Mapping is perhaps the earliest form of tracking data about one's historical location.
Not unlike modem historical GPS data, maps depicted where the cartographer had
been at a time in the past. The earliest known map dates back to 2300 B.c., and was
excavated from the ruined Mesopotamian city Ga-Sur at Nuzi, which is in present-day
Iraq. 100 MAPS: THE SCIENCE, ART AND POLITICS OF CARTOGRAPHY THROUGHOUT
HISTORY 18 (John O. E. Clark ed., 2005).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Kyllo v. United States, 534 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting how Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has been criticized as "unpredictable"); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting how the course of Fourth
Amendment precedents has not been "smooth").
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. I, II. 285-90 (Wash. Square Press
New Folger Ed. 2004) ("The man i' th' moon's too slow-till newborn chins [b]e
rough and razorable; she that from whom [w]e all were sea-swallowed, though some
cast again, And by that destiny to perform an act [w]hereof what's past is prologue,
what to come, [i]n yours and my discharge.").
By no means do I intend this article to provide a comprehensive history of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence; that would take a tome. I simply provide a brief primer
here to put later decisions by the Supreme Court and district courts into greater
context.
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1700-1791: The Origins of the Fourth Amendment

The legislative history detailing the Framers' precise understanding
of, and motivation behind, the Fourth Amendment is sparse.32 The
initial draft of the amendment was prepared by James Madison, and
sent to the House of Representatives for consideration in a form not
dissimilar from the current text. 33 Madison's draft amendment
thereafter received slight wordsmithing by the Committee of
Eleven,34 and then by Representative Egert Benson of New York. 35 It
was subsequently adopted by both Houses of Congress and ratified
by the States in its current form.36
Despite the scarcity of legislative history, however, judges and
scholars have attempted to divine the original intent from several
sources available to the Framers prior to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, including: (1) precedents from English and colonial courts;
32.

33.

34.

35.
36.

Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 1097, 1106 (1998) (noting that "no Framer ever said that this is what the
Amendment did or should mean"); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Searchand-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 & n.34 (1983) ("The actual
'legislative history' of the fourth amendment reveals little about the intended scope of
its protections ...."). This conclusion is buttressed by the leading scholarly treatises,
which analyze the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment. See WILLIAM J.
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, at
669-72, 691-98, 704-08 (2009); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 39-43 (1966);
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51, 65-102 (1970).
Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483, 514-15 (1995).
The original draft of the amendment read as follows:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be
searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 434-35 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834».
Id. at 516. For reasons that are not clear, the Committee of Eleven reported a draft of
the amendment to the full House that omitted that phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. (citing LANDYNSKI, supra note 32, at 41; LASSON, supra note 32, at
101).
Id. Benson is credited with changing the phrase "by warrants issuing" to "and no
warrant shall issue." Id.
Id. at 516-17.
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(2) various state constitutional documents; and (3) the state
ratification debates. 37
Based on these sources, the Fourth
Amendment is commonly understood as an attempt to break from the
past abuses associated with the use of general warrants 38 and writs of
assistance 39 by the British Crown, and to provide a safeguard against
unreasonable government trespasses into a person's home or property
interests. 4o And as will be seen below, these roots are important to
the precedents leading up to Jones and the result in the Jones decision
itself.41
The legal precedents that presaged the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment concerned civil cases brought by persons aggrieved by
trespassory searches executed by government agents on the authority
of general warrants and writs of assistance. 42 The first major step
toward change actually came in a case where the plaintiffs lost, and
the writs of assistance prevailed. 43 In 1760, in Boston, after the thenexisting writs of assistance expired, agents of the Crown applied for
renewed writs to continue the practice of unfettered searches of
property belonging to the colonists by customs officers.44 The
37.
38.

39.

40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-71; see also LANDYNSKl, supra note 32, at 39--40.
General warrants were a tool used by law enforcement in Great Britain throughout
much of the 1700's. Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 353-54 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing
LASSON, supra note 32, at 24--42). They empowered their holders to "'seize, take
hold and bum ... books, and things ... offensive to the state,'" all without any
showing of probable cause or suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Stewart, supra note
32, at 1369 (quoting LANDYNSKl, supra note 32, at 21). These general warrants were
principally aimed at suppressing speech deemed libelous against the British Crown.
Id.
Writs of assistance used means similar to those used to execute general warrants, but
they were employed to combat a different problem: tax evasion, particularly by
inhabitants of the British colonies. Stewart, supra note 32, at 1370. Specifically,
writs of assistance gave British customs inspectors unlimited power to search
anywhere at their discretion to ferret out attempts to smuggle goods into or out of the
colonies without paying the Crown's onerous taxes. Id.
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1707, 1726-27 (1996) (reviewing CUDDllIY, supra note 32); see also Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1,23 (1995) ("The use of general warrants to search for evidence of
violations of the Crown's revenue laws understandably outraged the authors of the
Bill of Rights."); Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-70 (citing LANDYNSKl, supra note
32, at 30--48; LASSON, supra note 32, at 51-105).
See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text; infra Part LB.
Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-70.
Id. at 1370--71.
Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 8600. L.J. 979, 991-92 (2011).
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colonists retained James Otis to present their case challenging the
new writS. 45 The main question presented before the Court in this
Writs of Assistance Case46 was whether the Court should permit
unconditional writs of indefmite duration, or whether they must be
tied to a specific instance, for a search of a specific place, based on
And while the colonists
information specified under oath. 47
ultimately lost their case, the arguments raised by Otis-which were
steeped in dire warnings about government agents having the ability
"to enter forceably into a dwelling house, and rifle every part of
it'>48-had profound influence on John Adams, a key Framer, and
other colonists who would later seek independence from the British. 49
Similar battles were being fought across the pond over the use of
general warrants. For example, in Wilkes v. Wood,50 John Wilkes
brought suit over the general warrant issued by the British Secretary
of State, Lord Halifax, authorizing four Crown messengers to search
for the printers and publishers of the "seditious" publication, The
North Briton, No. 45. 51 Because the warrant did not specify the
particular persons to be seized or the places to be searched, those
executing the warrant ended up arresting forty-nine people over a
three-day period and confiscating vast quantities of their private
papers.52 In awarding damages to Wilkes for the trespass, the English
court found the warrant to be "hopelessly defective" because it lacked
the "offenders' names" or an inventory of what was to be taken
away.53 The court concluded that the use of the warrant here was
"totally subversive of the liberty of the subject [Wilkes].,,54

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

Id. at 992.
This case is also referred to as the Paxton Case. Id. at 992 n.79.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 993-94.
Id. at 1004-05; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting
John Adams' observation that Otis' oration was "the fIrst act of opposition" to the
British Crown and that "[t]hen and there the child of Independence was born");
Stewart, supra note 32, at 1370-71 (citing LASSON, supra note 32, at 51).
Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-70.
Id. at 1369; Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He Is Quiet":
Suspicionless Searches, "Special Needs" And General Warrants, 74 MISS. LJ. 501,
506 (2004) (recounting the Wilkes case).
Sundby, supra note 52, at 506.
Id.
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The English Courts reached a similar result shortly thereafter in
Entick v. Carrington. 55 In that decision, the court was again called on
to decide an action for trespass by the victim of a general warrant. 56
Specifically, Crown messengers entered the plaintiffs house and
broke open his desks and boxes in a search for his private papers in
an effort to fmd "seditious" materials. 57 In rendering a verdict for the
plaintiff, the court again recognized that property law rendered the
home sacrosanct, and that any trespasser therein would be liable in
damages. 58
Importantly, however, Entick made the simple
observation that, absent a physical trespass, observation of things in
public view would not result in liability because "the eye cannot by
the laws of England be guilty oftrespass.,,59
Following these decisions and others, in 1766, the British House of
Commons voted to outlaw the use of general warrants in libel
investigations. 60 These developments were known to the Framers
when they later proposed the Fourth Amendment and influenced their
legislative actions. 61
But the Framers had more than simple legal precedents upon which
to rely when they were debating the Fourth Amendment. The basic
tenets of the Fourth Amendment were already enshrined in many
state constitutional documents that provided protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 62 As these provisions make
clear, the drafters of these protections were still concerned with

55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.

61.

62.

Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
Id. at 1030, 1038.
Id. at 1038.
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817 ("[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred,
that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave; if he does he
is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour's
ground, he must justify it by law. ").
Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066.
Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869,
909-10 (1985); George C. Thomas, III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers'
Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 199,214 (2010).
Boyd v. United States, 166 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886); Clancy, supra note 44, at 1055
n.442 (recounting how Justice Story concluded that the Framers were influenced by
the cases emanating from the abuses of writs of assistance and general warrants);
Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved CommonLaw Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in "Due Process of Law"-Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness" Is Only a Modem, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 51, 108 (2010); Stewart, supra note 32, at 1371.
Stewart, supra note 32, at 1371.
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curbing the abuse of general warrants. For example, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided that
general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and
ought not to be granted. 63
The constitutions of Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania provided similar protections. 64 But more than reacting
to the abuses associated with general warrants, these provisions also
safeguarded the right to be "secure" in one's house and in one's
property.65 These state constitutional provisions provided models for
the Framers when they were drafting the Fourth Amendment. 66
But in addition to the groundbreaking legal precedents and the state
constitutional forerunners to the Fourth Amendment, scholars have
also traced the original intent of the Fourth Amendment from the
state ratification debates. 67 Research into these sources shows the
Framers were still concerned about trespassory searches, but also
searches unbounded by any sense of reason or restraint. 68 For
example, in the Virginia debates, Patrick Henry warned against the
specter of government intrusion into homes and argued that "unless
the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some
similar restriction, [government agents could] go into your cellars and
rooms, and measure everything you eat, drink, or wear. They ought
to be restrained within proper bounds.,,69 Likewise, during the
Maryland debates, concern was raised about whether "an officer of

63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

VA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 10.
DEL. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 17; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art.
23; N.C. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 11; PA. CONST. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, art. 10.
Clancy, supra note 44, at 1028, 1038.
ld. at 1046-47; see also Stewart, supra note 32, at 137l.
James Leonard, Note, Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives
Katz, N.C. L. REv. 546, 549 n.25 (1984-1985).
Clancy, supra note 44, at 1032-33.
Leonard, supra note 67, at 549 n.25.
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the United States should force [his way into] the house, the asylum of
a citizen," without any check of reasonableness and restraint. 70
So while the express legislative history behind the Fourth
Amendment may be scant, these primary sources do provide some
basis upon which to draw inferences about the purpose behind the
Amendment. Specifically, these early sources show that the Framers
considered the home to be sacrosanct and something to be protected
against government intrusions, a concept that was buttressed by the
common law theory of trespass. 71 In addition, the Framers were
concerned about the overreach associated with general warrants, and
strived to ensure some level of specificity of the person and place to
be searched. 72 Finally, the Framers recognized the need for law
enforcement to engage in searches to ferret out wrongdoing, provided
those searches were kept within the bounds ofreasonableness. 73
B.

1791-1967: Early Fourth Amendment Case Law Adopts
Property-Law-Based Paradigm

Following the Fourth Amendment's ratification in 1791, there were
relatively few early court decisions construing its meaning. 74
Scholars speculate that this largely has to do with the fact that the
Fourth Amendment originally only applied to the federal government
and not the states,15 and the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction in
the early years of the Republic was much narrower than it is today. 76
But the few cases to reach the Fourth Amendment hewed closely to
the property-law-based precepts that motivated the Framers.
The first major construction of the Fourth Amendment by the
Supreme Court came in Boyd v. United States, a case involving,

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

76.

Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 777
(1994).
See Clancy, supra note 44, at 1058.
ld. at 1045-47.
See id. at 996-97 (noting how even Otis in the Writs of Assistance case argued that
"[f]or flagrant Crimes, and in Cases of great public Necessity, the Priviledge [sic] may
be incrohd [encroached] on" by execution ofa special warrant).
Davies, supra note 61, at 108.
Jd. at 108-09. The Supreme Court did not hold the Fourth Amendment as
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the States until 1949.
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Davies, supra note 61, at 109.
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ironically,77 violations of customs laws. 78 In that case, federal
officers suspected certain goods had been improperly imported. 79
Relying on a federal statute that permitted the U.S. Attorney to apply
for a court order mandating that certain books and papers be turned
over to the court for potential use as evidence, the district court
ordered the defendants to produce invoices that were used as
evidence against them in trial. 80 The Supreme Court held that the
district court's order violated the Fourth Amendment on the grounds
that it mandated an "invasion of [the defendants'] indefeasible
right[s] of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.,,81
The next major Fourth Amendment opinion came in 1914 in Weeks
v. United States. 82 In that case, police officers found a spare key to
the defendant's home, entered when he was not there, and searched
his papers in order to find evidence he was using the mail to promote
an illegal gambling enterprise. 83 Over the defendant's objection on
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, the district court permitted the
prosecution to introduce evidence of various lottery tickets and
correspondence that had been obtained during the search and related
to the illegal lottery scheme. 84 The Court recognized that the police
have the right to make searches incident to legal arrests, and thereby
have the right to "discover and seize the fruits or evidences of
crime.,,85 However, with regard to what happened here, the Court
recognized "that a man's house was his castle, and not to be invaded
by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.,,86
Because the police's trespass violated the sanctity of the defendant's
home, the Court reversed and ordered a new trial. 87

77.

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

The facts are ironic given that, as detailed above, one of the motivations behind the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment was the fact that the British customs agents
abused writs of assistance to inspect and seize goods that were allegedly imported in
violation of customs laws. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617-18 (1886).
!d.
Id.
Id. at 630.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 398.
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The culmination of this property-law-based view of the Fourth
Amendment, and the first major Supreme Court case to deal with the
application of the Fourth Amendment to emerging communication
technologies, was Olmstead v. United States. 88 At issue in Olmstead
was whether the police had violated the Fourth Amendment by
intercepting private telephone conversations through the use of
wiretaps.89 The federal officers investigating the defendants had
reason to believe they were involved in a large bootlegging
conspiracy to sell prohibited liquors. 9o To further their investigation,
the federal officers tapped the phones of four of the conspirators by
installing small wires onto the ordinary telephone wires outside of the
homes of these conspirators. 91 The Court upheld the convictions,
principally because "[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of
the defendants."92 The Court reasoned that the telephone wires were
no more a part of the homes of the defendants than the public
highways.93 But also underlying the Court's decision was the fact
that the signals that were actually intercepted did not constitute the
kind of "material thing" that the Fourth Amendment covered. 94
Finally, undergirding the Court's rationale was that the defendants
had chosen to use the technology of the phone to amplify their voices
outside their homes, and hence were exposing their incriminating
statements to anyone in the world who could hear them. 95 The Court
concluded that Congress could pass legislation providing further
protections in this area;96 but as for the Fourth Amendment, it simply
did not reach so far.97
While the decision in Olmstead was a high-water mark for the
property-law-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, it was

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

96.
97.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,455 (1928).
Jd.
Jd. at 455-56.
Jd. at 456-57.
Jd. at 464.
Jd. at 465.
Jd. at 464.
Jd. at 466 ("The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside,
and that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.").
Jd. at 465-66.
Jd. at 466.
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not unanimous. 98 Specifically, in one of several dissents, Justice
Brandeis postulated a theory of the Fourth Amendment that reached
beyond the property-law-focused strictures of past precedents. 99 He
argued that the Framers meant to protect not just people's material
things, but also "their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations."lOo Recognizing this, and that advancing technologies
allow the government to exercise "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching
means of invading privacy," Justice Brandeis would have reversed
the convictions. lol This dissent is significant because it would lay the
groundwork for the Court's later, more expansive interpretation of
what the Fourth Amendment protects. 102
In addition to not being unanimous, Justice Taft's majority in
Olmstead also was not the last word on the issue of wiretapping of
telephone communications. lo3 Specifically, just six years after the
decision, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of
1934,104 which outlawed wiretapping. 105 And this is notable because
it would not be the last time that Congress legislated in an area of
technology that the Court held was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 106
Thus, while trespass theory won the day in Olmstead, and indeed
prevailed in remaining good law for another thirty years,107 these
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

104.
105.

106.
107.

See id. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 478.
Jd.
Jd. at 473, 479.
Amy L. Peikoff, Pragmatism and Privacy, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 638, 645 (2010);
see also Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two
Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391, 402-03 (2010).
See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801 (2004)
(analyzing the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of wiretapping).
Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 223 (1934).
See Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 363
n.117 (2009); see also Robert A. Pikowski, An Overview of the Law of Electronic
Surveillance Post September 11, 2011, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 601, 603 (2002).
See Scolnik, supra note 105, at 372.
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (holding that police's use of
"spike mike" inserted from an adjoining row house onto the wall of the defendant's
home constituted a Fourth Amendment violation because "the eavesdropping was
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises
occupied by the petitioners"); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942)
(holding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when agents held a
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ancillary developments-Brandeis' dissent and the legislative
response-would lay the groundwork for the next evolution of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in the coming decades.108
C.

1967-2011: Katz Ushers in a Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Based on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy

The Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in Katz v. United States
represented a sea change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 109 In
Katz, the defendant was convicted of transmitting illegal wagering
information using a public telephone. 110 The key pieces of evidence
were recordings of the defendant's own telephone conversations,
which FBI agents accessed by attaching an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth that the
defendant used to relay the bets. III The Court started its analysis by
jettisoning the notion that the Fourth Amendment protected only
specific "constitutionally protected area[ s]"; 112 rather, the Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.,,113 Then,
the Court rejected the notion that, absent a trespass, there can be no
Fourth Amendment violation, and seemingly overruled Olmstead and
its property-law-based progeny. I 14
The Court held that the
"Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the [defendant's] words violated the privacy upon which he
justifiably relied" while in the closed phone booth.115 In reaching this
decision, the Court noted "the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication.,,116 Finally, the Court held

108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

115.
116.

detectaphone device up to a wall to hear what was happening within because "use of
the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or unlawful entry"}.
See supra notes 99-102, 105-D6 and accompanying text.
See 389 U.S. 347 (1967); infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
Id.
Id.at350-51.
Id. at 351.
Jd. at 353 ("Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell
outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on
which that decision rested.").
Id.
Id. at 352.
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that such a warrantless search was "per se unreasonable," and that no
exception to the warrant requirement applied. 117
While the decision was 7-1, Justice Harlan wrote a concurring
opinion that was later adopted as reflecting the reorientation and
enlargement of the protections of the Fourth Amendment that the
Court recognized in Katz. I 18 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan held
that the Court would recognize a search occurred under the Fourth
Amendment if two conditions were met: "flrst that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable. ",119 It is this formulation that is commonly referred to as
"the Katz test.,,120
The Katz decision was a watershed moment for a variety of
reasons. Principally, by reorienting the analysis away from a
trespassory theory, the Court opened up broad new swaths of territory
where the Fourth Amendment could provide protections, including
new technologies. 121 But the decision also raised a number of new
ways in which individuals could cede Fourth Amendment protections
by exposing their conduct to the world in a manner that society would
not reasonably afford privacy protections. 122 In other words, even if
strict property law theories might have provided protections in the
past, the use of new technologies might not be protected if common
usage or the particular characteristics of the device might not be
considered sufflciently "private" by "society.,,123 A number of
decisions in the aftermath of Katz attempted to sort out these new

117. Id. at 357-58.
118. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining
that the established Katz test "has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice
Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz"); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REv. 409, 427
(2007) ("In subsequent cases, the Court has adopted Justice Harlan's two-pronged
formulation of Fourth Amendment application as the standard analysis for
determining whether or not a search has occurred.").
119. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
120. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test,
40 MCGEORGE L. REv. I, 6-7 (2009).
121. Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made oj?, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 781,789-90 (2008).
122. See id. at 790.
123. See id.
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boundaries, and in the process created several new contours to the
Fourth Amendment. 124
For example, the Supreme Court established 125 the third-party
doctrine post-Katz on the theory that information revealed to a third
party loses Fourth Amendment protections, thereby allowing the
Government to acquire the infonnation from the third-party without a
warrant. 126 This rule was exemplified in the case of United States v.
Miller. 127 In that case, the defendant, a bootlegger, challenged the
federal prosecutor's use of subpoenas to his bank to obtain bank
records. 128 Building off of its prior precedent that a defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in voluntary communications with
an undercover informant,129 the Court held that, by sharing the
fmancial information with a third party, the defendant had assumed
the risk it would be turned over to the government. 130 Importantly,
the Court held that the third-party doctrine would apply "even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.,,131 Miller thus represented an early application of the
Katz reasonable expectation test, and in it the Court concluded that

124. Aside from spawning new case law, the decision in Katz also spurred legislative
action in the area of wiretaps. For example, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.c. § 2510 (2006). United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-63 (2012); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap,
Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of
Age, 97 MINN. L. REv. 407, 488 & n.449 (2012).
125. Perhaps it is more accurate to say the Court reaffirmed the doctrine post-Katz. This is
because the Court had previously ruled that one's use of the telephone wires had the
result of amplifying his voice to the outside world and thus any Fourth Amendment
protections were lost. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
Likewise, when a person's voice was so loud that it could be heard through a spike
mike on.the adjoining wall, no Fourth Amendment protections inured. Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961). These could be construed as early
precursors to the third-party doctrine.
126. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 438-39.
129. See id. at 440 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966».
130. Id. at 442-43.
131. Id. at 443.
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society would not recognize as reasonable a defendant's claim to a
privacy interest in information voluntarily shared with a third party. 132
In addition, the Court established the Fourth Amendment standing
doctrine.133 Specifically, in Rakas v. Illinois,134 the Court rejected a
Fourth Amendment challenge to a warrantless search by passengers
in a car on the theory that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and
cannot be asserted vicariously.135 The Court held that because the
passengers in the car had neither a property nor a possessory interest
in the vehicle, they could not claim their Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when the car was searched and the officer found a
This decision thus applied the Katz reasonable
shotgun. 136
expectation test, and concluded that society would not deem
passengers to have a reasonable expectation of privacy when
traveling in someone else's car. 137
Finally, the Court established the open fields doctrine, which
provides that there is no expectation of privacy in the open fields
away from the curtilage of one's home. 138 While this doctrine could
be seen as a corollary to the third-party doctrine (i.e., that people
essentially share with the world what can be viewed in open fields
because they have not taken steps to shield all views), it is significant
because it permitted a technical trespass onto lands without a Fourth
Amendment violation. 139 The doctrine was developed 140 in the case
of Oliver v. United States. 141 In that case, state police trespassed onto
132. Id. at 442-44; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979) (holding that
the installation of pen register did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
caller was exposing to the phone company the numbers he was dialing).
133. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1978).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 130, 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
136. Id. at 148.
137. See id. at 148-49.
138. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
139. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (stating that the Court has
consistently held that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties"), with Oliver, 466 U.S. at 17779 (holding that the expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that
society recognizes as reasonable, and thus, government intrusion upon such open
fields does not constitute an unreasonable search).
140. Again, it may be more accurate to say that the Court was simply reaffirming the open
fields doctrine in this case because it had previously recognized that law enforcement
could enter open fields without violating the Constitution in Court in Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
141. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
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the defendant's lands and eventually came upon a field of marijuana
nearly a mile from the defendant's home. 142 In holding that no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred, the Court applied Katz and held that
"an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities
conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately
surrounding the home.,,143
Based on the establishment of these basic principles in the
application of the Katz test, the Supreme Court went on to reach
decisions in several areas involving new technologies. l44 First, in
perhaps the most low-tech example, the Court in Texas v. Brown held
that a police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a
driver of a car when he used a flashlight to illuminate the inside of
the vehicle and found contraband. 145 Applying a corollary to the open
fields and third-party doctrines, the plain view exception, the Court
held that the officer simply used "artificial" means to enhance his
view of what the defendant was already displaying to the public, and
hence there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy. 146
The second category of cases applying post-Katz rules involved the
use of beepers that emit a signal to track the beeper's movements. 147
In United States v. Knotts,148 in an effort to track the movements of a
suspected manufacturer of illicit drugs, the police attached a beeper
to a container of chemicals with the consent of the vendor, and the
container was then sold to the defendant. 149 In analyzing the
information that the police obtained, the Court recognized that the
beeper simply gave the police information about where the defendant

142.
143.
144.

145.
146.

147.
148.
149.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 177-78.
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708, 712 (1984) (holding that the
Government did not engage in a search by placing a beeper into a can of ether that
was later sold to the defendant and used to track his whereabouts); Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 731, 739-40 (1983) (discussing the applicability of the plain view doctrine
when an officer is aided by a flashlight); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277,
281 (1983) (discussing one's expectation of privacy while traveling on public roads in
the context of a beeper being placed within a container of chloroform, which law
enforcement officials then tracked to respondent's secluded cabin).
Brown, 460 U.S. at 739-40.
ld.
Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I'm Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment
in the 21st Century, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 187,203 (2012).
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
1d. at 278.
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was while on public roads. ISO And so again applying a principle akin
to the third-party doctrine, the Court found no search had occurred
under Katz because "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.,,151 But as the Court found the
following year in United States v. Karo,152 this beeper technology
could not be used to monitor what was going on inside a dwelling
because that would give the police "information that it could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.,,153
In the next major case to test the breadth of Katz where new
technologies were involved, the Court was called on again to revisit
and reaffirm the open fields and the third-party doctrines. 154 In
California v. Ciraolo, ISS the Court confronted whether the police
violated the defendant's rights when they used a helicopter to conduct
aerial surveillance and saw from 1,000 feet in the air that the
defendant was growing marijuana in his backyard behind large
fences. 156 In ruling against the defendant, the Court reaffirmed the
notion that the police do not conduct a search when they simply view
what a person exposes to the public, even if some effort must be
undertaken to see what is revealed. 157 In addition, the Court noted
that air travel was routine and that this vitiated any expectation that
one's backyard would never be exposed to aerial surveillance. ISS
The next major technologically advanced Fourth Amendment case
was Kyllo v. United States. 159 In that case, agents from the
Department of the Interior, while sitting in their car on the street,
used a thermal imaging device to scan the outside of the home of a
suspected manufacturer of marijuana. 160 After the imager reported
elevated levels of heat being given off, which suggested a high-power
grow-light was being used, the agents obtained a warrant to the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 281.
Id.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Jd. at 714-15; see also id. at 712 (noting that "[ilt is the exploitation of technological
advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence").
See Pesciotta, supra note 147, at 206.
California v. Ciraol0, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Jd. at 29-30.
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search the home, which yielded evidence of the indoor marijuana
growing operation. 161 In reversing the defendant's conditional guilty
plea, the Supreme Court held that the agents obtained information
about the interior of the home through artificial means not in use by
the general public, and hence a Fourth Amendment search had
occurred. 162 In reaching this decision, the Court shucked off the
notion that the imager was simply recording what the inhabitants
inside the home were exposing to the public. 163 Thus, while the Court
recognized that "the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment" may be affected by the "advance of
technology,"l64 pursuant to Karo (and perhaps even also Boyd and
Weeks) it would still constitute a Fourth Amendment violation if
agents used technology to accomplish a "virtual" trespass to learn
information about what is going on inside the home. 165
Finally, the most recent post-Katz but pre-Jones case involving
emerging technologies was Ontario v. Quon. 166 Rather than arising in
the context of a criminal investigation, this case involved a challenge
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a police officer who was
disciplined after his supervisors reviewed the contents of his text
messages sent over a work-issued pager and found he sent a large
volume of non-work-related text messages. 167 Using the Fourth
Amendment test applicable when the government acts in its capacity
as an employer and not as a criminal investigator, the Court held that
the search was reasonable because it was related to a legitimate work
purpose and it was not excessive in scope. 168 But the opinion is more
notable for what it did not decide. Specifically, the Court simply
assumed that the officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his text messages, without reaching a holding on that question. 169 But
the Court provided fascinating guideposts for the relevant inquiry
into whether an individual has a reasonable expectation in the use of
a new technology, including whether the use of the technology is
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

ld. at 30.
ld. at 34-35.
ld. at 35-36.
ld. at 33-34.
See id. at 34.
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
ld. at 2625-26.
ld. at 2632-33.
ld. at 2630.
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essential to modem living, whether the technology is ubiquitous and
able to be personally owned, and whether there are stated policies ex
ante about the privacy expectations in the use of the technology.170
But while the Court raised these issues, it left deciding them for
another day, particularly because the ramifications of these emerging
technologies were not yet fully understood. 171
In sum, in the aftermath of Katz, the Supreme Court confronted
new questions involving the application of the Fourth Amendment to
new technologies. And while some critics suggest the post-Katz
jurisprudence is "subjective and unpredictable,,,172 a few guiding
principles emerge. It is certainly permissible for the police to observe
what is in plain view 173 and revealed to third parties. 174 The police
may even use artificial aids and new technologies to enhance their
sensory perception. 175 But the home is still sacrosanct, and it is a
search when new technologies that are not routinely used by ordinary
citizens are utilized by the police to accomplish an electronic or
virtual trespass into the confines of the home. 176 Pre-Jones, these
guiding lights were generally accepted as the reigning Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. But the Court's decision in Jones signals,
perhaps, another evolution.
II.

PINGING 177 THE PRESENT: EXAMINING THE DECISION
IN UNITED STATES V. JONES

Starting in 2004, the police suspected that Antoine Jones, an owner
of a D.C. nightclub, was involved in a narcotics trafficking

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citing critical sources).
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1990).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
739-40 (1983).
176. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
177. "Pinging" refers to when a cell phone company sends a signal to a cellphone to
determine its location. See Recent Case, Criminal Procedure-Fourth AmendmentSixth Circuit Holds that "Pinging" a Target's Cell Phone to Obtain GPS Data Is not
a Search Subject to the Warrant Requirement-United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d
772 (6th Cir. 2012), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, No. 09-6497 (6th Cir. Sept. 26,
2012), 126 HARv. L. REv. 802, 806 & n.41 (2013); Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track
Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate
Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 494-95 (2012).
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conspiracy. 178 After a joint FBI and D.C police team had engaged
several other investigative techniques, the Government applied for a
warrant to install a GPS tracking device to the undercarriage of a car
registered to Jones's wife: 79 The application was granted, directing
that the device be installed in D.C. and within ten days!80 The device
was not installed, however, until eleven days after the warrant was
issued, and it was installed in Maryland. 181 Nevertheless, the device
was utilized, and provided information on Jones's whereabouts for a
period of twenty-eight days because Jones was the exclusive driver of
the vehicle. 182 Jones was later convicted, but his conviction was
reversed by the D.C. Circuit. 183 In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit held
that a search had occurred, predominately because the GPS device
allowed the police to know "the whole of Jones's movements during
the month," which the court held inimical to reasonable expectations
of privacy. 184 In other words, the court held it might be reasonable
for one to expect one's movements to be observed by someone else
on one day or on a single joumey;185 however, when every movement
is tracked over an extended period of time, that reveals the full
picture of what the person was doing, and at that point reasonable
expectations of privacy are invaded. 186 Scholars have termed this
understanding of the Fourth Amendment the "mosaic theory.,,187
On certiorari, all the Justices of the Court agreed that a search had
occurred on the facts presented, but they were fractured as to the
reasoning. 188 Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia
focused on the installation of the GPS device to the undercarriage of
the car, an "effect" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 189 Relying on
the property-law-based underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment,
stretching back to the Entick case for support, the majority concluded
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,948 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 949.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556.
!d. at 563.
See Kerr, supra note 5, at 313, 320.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 953.
Id. at 949.
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that "[ w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion [of installing
and using the GPS device] would have been considered a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted.,,190 In reaching this decision, the Court resurrected the
property-law-based approach of the Fourth Amendment espoused in
Olmstead, and held that trespass theory provides a constitutional
"minimum" of protection, and that the Katz test could provide a
greater zone of protection even when information is obtained in the
absence of a physical trespass. 191 But after reaching this narrow
holding that a search had occurred, the Court declined to consider
whether the search was nonetheless reasonable, or whether some
exception to the warrant requirement applied. 192
Despite joining the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor also wrote
a separate concurrence that raised a number of new questions. 193 She
indicated she agreed that, at a minimum, a physical trespass by the
Government to obtain information will result in a search, which was
sufficient to decide Jones's case. 194 However, she went on to signal a
willingness to embrace some of what the proponents of the mosaic
theory espouse, namely that "longer term GPS monitoring" might
violate expectations of property for the investigations of "most
offenses.,,195 She expressed concern about the use of investigative
technologies that "generate [] a precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements.,,196 Finally, recognizing that people
often cede vast amounts of information to third parties to carry out
everyday tasks, Justice Sotomayor hinted that "it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties." 197
In his own concurrence, Justice Alito raised many of the concerns
shared by Justice Sotomayor. 198 Specifically, Justice Alito noted that
society would not consider it reasonable for the police to "secretly

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

ld.
ld. at 950,953-54.
ld. at 954.
Jd. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Jd. at 954.
ld. at 955 (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
Jd.
ld. at 957.
See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car
for a very long period.,,199 He opined that four weeks of such
surveillance "surely" was too long for most routine criminal
investigations. 20o However, he held out the possibility that longer
monitoring would be permissible for investigations of certain
"extraordinary offenses. ,,201
So, at root, the Jones opinion decided very little, and seems to raise
more questions than it answered. The opinion raises substantial
issues specifically with regard to GPS tracking, generally with regard
to new technologies, and fundamentally with regard to the Fourth
Amendment. Given the amount of dicta and open questions in the
Jones decision, it has naturally spawned a great deal of litigation in
the lower courts. And as detailed below, district courts are filling in
these gaps, often with surprising results, potentially setting up further
review by the Supreme Court.
III. TRIANGULATING 202 THE FUTURE: EXPLORING HOW
DISTRICT COURTS ARE ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS
LEFT OPEN IN JONES
In the 365 days since the Jones opinion was issued on January 23,
2012, it has been cited by lower federal and state courts 193 times. 203
And with few exceptions, those decisions show the lower courts are
moving cautiously, and relying on long-established doctrines and
precedents in a way that prevents Jones from operating as a major
realignment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Part
describes first the ways in which federal and state trial courts are
evaluating GPS evidence in the aftermath of Jones, with an eye
towards evaluating whether courts in fact are requiring a warrant to
obtain GPS evidence or whether any of the long-established

199.
200.
201.
202.

ld.
ld.
ld.
Triangulating refers to a method in which location information is derived from cell
phone or GPS data. When a cell phone or GPS-enabled device is activated, it sends a
signal to cell phone towers in the area or satellites overhead. By comparing the length
or angle of the radio signals between several of these structures, it is possible to
triangulate the location of the signal-emitting phone. See Who Knows Where You've
Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use o/Cellular Phones as Personal Locators,
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-09 (2004).
203. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
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exceptions to the warrant requirement apply. Then, this Part goes on
to examine Jones's effect on other technologies, including
smartphones, pole cameras, peer to peer sharing, key fobs, and
wireless internet networks. Finally, this Part looks at how district
courts are evaluating the Fourth Amendment in a more general sense
after Jones, including whether they are evaluating the Amendment
under the now-revived property-law paradigm, or whether they are
embracing the mosaic theory, or whether the Katz paradigm still
reIgns supreme.
A.

Jones's Impact on the Use of GPS Tracking Information Without
a Warrant

As detailed above, the Supreme Court in Jones left open a number
of questions with regard to obtaining GPS tracking evidence. 204
Specifically, the Court declined to decide whether a warrantless
search to obtain GPS evidence could nonetheless still be considered a
"reasonable" search, and hence constitutional. 205 In addition, the
Court's decision in favor of Jones raised a number of issues with
regard to what should happen to other cases in which warrantless
GPS evidence was already used, including who had standing to use
Jones to contest the use of GPS evidence, whether any exception to
the warrant requirement applied even where the defendant has
standing, and whether the decision could apply retroactively to cases
on collateral review. 206 In the year since Jones was decided, district
courts are answering these questions in a manner that shows a clear
pattern of caution is emerging. 207
The first area that district courts have evaluated is whether a
warrantless search for GPS evidence could nonetheless still be
reasonable. This is significant because according to its text, the
Fourth Amendment "does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but
only those that are unreasonable. ,,208 What is reasonable "depends on
all of the circumstances surrounding a search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself.,,209 As a general matter, when
law enforcement engages in a search under the Fourth Amendment, a
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 206-23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text
See supra Part III.A.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
ld. (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,537 (1985)).
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warrant is usually required.2IO However, the Court has recognized
certain exceptions to the warrant requirement, including, when under
the "totality of the circumstances," the search is nonetheless
reasonable. 2lI Specifically, to make the required showing of
reasonableness, the court must balance "the degree to which [the
search] intrudes on an individual's privacy and, ... the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government
interests. ,,212
Four lower court decisions have applied this test to GPS evidence
post-Jones,213 and the majority-three-have found warrantless
searches for GPS information to be reasonable. 214 For example, in
United States v. Robinson,215 the Court noted that the installation of a
GPS tracking device on the defendant's car was "non-invasive and
did not interfere with the operation of the vehicle" and that the agents
"had reasonable suspicion that Robinson was engaged in criminal
activity .... ,,216 Pursuant to the Samson balancing test, this showing
was sufficient to permit the warrantless search.217 Furthermore, and
importantly, the Court recognized that "[i]t may well be that in a
future opinion the Eighth Circuit will modify its approach to the issue
in light of Jones, but until such time," the Court will continue to
apply prior precedents on the issue.218 This kind of caution is
emblematic of the approach taken by lower courts in the aftermath of
Jones.219 Following this logic and guided by a jurisprudential caution

210.

Id.

21l. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code,
Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d. 177,
179 (D. Mass. 2012) [hereinafter In re Application of U.S.]; United States v. Ford,
No. I: 11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Oct 30, 2012); United States v.
Robinson, No. S2-4:1ICR00361AGF, 2012 WL 4893643, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15,
2012); United States v. Nelson, No. CR612"'{)05, 2012 WL 3052914, at *3 (S.D. Ga.
July 25,2012).
214. See In re Application of U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 179; Robinson, 2012 WL 4893643,
at *1; Nelson, 2012 WL 3052914, at *3.
215. Robinson, 2012 WL 4893643, at * 16-17.
216. Id. at *16. These arguments echoed the arguments made by the United States in its
brief before the Supreme Court in Jones.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *17.
219. See also In re Application of U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 179 ("Until either the First
Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court rule otherwise, or Congress enacts
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steeped in adherence to stare decisis, most lower courts to consider
the question have concluded that the warrantless installation and
monitoring of a GPS tracking device is "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment provided the installation is minimally invasive, lasts a
short duration, and is supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. 220
This result also makes sense in light of historical precedents.
Simply installing a beeper device in a package that is carried on
public roads (Knotts),22I or flying in airspace over an exposed area
(Cira%),222 or shining a flashlight into the interior of a car
(Brown)223 were upheld as minimally invasive searches that did not
otherwise impair the activities of the target, but rather simply further
exposed what would otherwise be visible to any member of the
public should they choose to look. 224 Likewise, GPS evidence is noninvasive, does not restrict the defendant's movements or otherwise
impinge on the use of the vehicle, and simply reveals what could be
learned from public observation. Thus, provided there is a showing
that the police have some legitimate law enforcement interest in the
target, the use of GPS tracking could be deemed reasonable postJones, just as it was in Robinson.
Relatedly, when evaluating reasonableness, district courts are also
answering one of the questions raised by Justice Alito's concurrence:
How long is too long? In his opinion in Jones, Justice Alito opined

220.

221.
222.
223.
224.

legislation dealing with the problem, the Court will follow [its previous rulings on the
issue].").
See In re Application of U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79 (ho!ding that a search for
historical cell phone tower information was reasonable where it was simply sufficient
to satisfy the standard for an order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), i.e., the government
must only demonstrate "specific and articulable facts" showing that there are
"reasonable grounds" to believe the information sought is relevant to a criminal
investigation); United States v. Nelson, No. CR612-005, 2012 WL 3052914, at *3
(S.D. Ga. July 25,2012) (holding that officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant
was involved in kidnappings, and hence it was reasonable for them to place GPS
tracking device on his vehicle to gather information about his movements). But see
United States v. Ford, No. 1:1I-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *8 (B.D. Tenn. Oct. 30,
2012) (holding that use of a GPS device was unreasonable where police used it as
substitute for 2417 physical monitoring and used it to confirm target was perpetrator of
string of robberies: "Both prongs of the totality of the circumstances test weigh in
favor of applying the traditional warrant requirement to GPS tracking device cases").
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983).
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207-10 (1986).
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,739-40 (1983).
See supra notes 144-158 and accompanying text.
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that four weeks of GPS surveillance would "surely" be long enough
as to constitute a search, but he stopped short of suggesting what
precise length of time would demarcate a constitutional threshold. 225
The majority opinion chided Justice Alito for failing to support or
elucidate further where his bright line would be.226 Notwithstanding
this lack of specificity, or perhaps because of it, lower courts have
been forced to respond to the dicta raised by Justice Alito's
concurrence on this issue. Specifically, defendants are raising
challenges in lower courts in the hopes that Justice Alito's suggestion
about the outer marker for the length of surveillance will resonate
with a future court.227 And while lower courts might be reluctant to
break new ground on other issues in the absence of clearer Supreme
Court edicts, on this issue, lower courts are actually hewing closer to
Justice Alito's suggested framework. 228 Specifically, since Jones,
lower courts have upheld warrantless searches of GPS data that lasted
for "only a few hours ,,,229 "under 24 hours ,,,230 three days ,231 four
days,232 and twelve days,233 but held that GPS tracking of seventeen
days234 and twenty-six days235 was unconstitutional. But in another
nod to judicial caution in this area, at least a few courts have decided

225. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
227. Defendant Marquis Lopez' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Motion
to Suppress Evidence at 1-2, United States v. Lopez, 2012 WL 3930317 (D. Del.
Sept. 10,2012), (No. 10-67-GMS), 2012 WL 3561010; Motion to Suppress Evidence
and Memorandum of Law at 3-4, United States v. Sereme, No. 2:11-CR-97-FtM29SPC, 2012 WL 1757702 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012), (No. 2:11-CR-97-FTM29SPC), 2012 WL 2522104.
228. See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
229. United States v. Wahchumwah, No. 11-30101, 2012 WL 5951624, at *3 (9th Cir.
Nov. 27, 2012) (holding that an undercover agent's warrantless use of a concealed
audio-video device was reasonable where it was for such a short duration).
230. United States v. Shelburne, No. 3:11-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at *5 (W.D. Ky.
June 20, 2012).
231. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Jones
because "[ w]hile Jones involved intensive monitoring over a twenty-eight day period,
here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner's cell phone for three days").
232. State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 154 (Ariz. App. 2012); see also Appellant's Opening
Briefat *3, 2012 WL 486827 (describing facts more specifically).
233. United States v. Sereme, No. 2:11-CR-97-FtM-29SPC, 2012 WL 1757702, at *10
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012).
234. United States v. Lopez, No. 1O-cr-67(GMS), 2012 WL 3930317, at *7 (D. Del. Sept.
10,2012).
235. State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 496 (S.D. 2012).
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that, absent further guidance by a majority of the Supreme Court,
they will not pinpoint how long is too long in the first instance. 236
Looking at the constellation of these decisions, it shows some
modest movement towards authorizing warrantless surveillance for
more discrete periods of time, i.e. less than three weeks, before
obtaining a warrant is indicated. Interestingly, however, no court has
yet considered the exception floated by Justice Alito that certain
crimes might require longer surveillance,237 such as a complex drug
conspiracy or a price-fixing scheme, or some other criminal
enterprise that requires a good deal of police legwork before the full
contours of the scheme come together in a manner sufficient to make
a charging decision. While this case may present itself in the future,
it is arguable whether such complex investigations could be defended
as constitutional on the argument that the very nature of these crimes
requires longer term surveillance and evidence-gathering. 238 In any
event, while the lower courts are still moving cautiously in this area,
the early post-Jones decisions show some movement toward the
framework suggested by Justice Alito. 239
A second major question that district courts are confronting is
whether, even if the installation of a GPS device is a search and an
unreasonable one, an exception to the warrant requirement
nonetheless still applies that prevents the exclusion of the evidence.
Patently, the exclusion of evidence obtained through an
unconstitutional search "is 'not a personal constitutional right,' nor is
it designed to 'redress the injury' occasioned by an unconstitutional

236. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389-90 (D. Md. 2012) (holding that
"the Fourth Amendment, as currently interpreted, does not contemplate a situation
where government surveillance becomes a 'search' only after some specified amount
of time"); cf Paige v. New York City Police Dept., No. 10-CV-3773 (STL)(LB),
2012 WL 1118012, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,2012) (holding that even "continued"
surveillance would not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, so long as the
surveillance was done while the target was in public).
237. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
238. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561~3 (\976) (holding that
suspicionless stops were justified near a border crossing because of unique
circumstances and challenges related to stopping crimes at that location). But see City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-43 (2000) (declining to apply special
needs exception to suspicionless roadblocks simply because law enforcement
considered narcotics-related crime to present a "severe and intractable" problem that
was difficult to combat).
239. See United States v. Amaya, 853 F. Supp. 2d 818, 831 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
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search.,,240 In fact, the Supreme Court has clarified that the "sole
purpose" of the exclusionary rule "is to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations.,,241 And not just any minimal or theoretical
deterrence will suffice; there must be a fmding that suppression will
result in "'appreciable deterrence. ",242
Pursuant to this
understanding, the Supreme Court has endorsed a number of
exceptions to the exclusionary rule where such deterrence will not be
achieved by suppression, including the good faith exception, the
independent source exception, and the inevitable discovery
exception?43 And consistent with the notion that district courts are
applying long-established precedents in a manner that prevents the
Jones holding from fundamentally realigning Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the lower courts are applying these exceptions and
refusing to exclude evidence obtained through warrantless GPS
tracking. 244
The post-Jones case law is legion with decisions applying the good
In recently
faith exception to warrantless GPS surveillance.
articulating the good faith exception, the Supreme Court stated that
"searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.,,245 Prior
to Jones, four appellate courts-the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits-held that the installation and use of GPS tracking devices
without a warrant was constitutiona1. 246 Accordingly, pursuant to a
240. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,2426 (2011) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).

241. Id.
242. Id. at 2426-27 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
243. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009); Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 538-39 (1988).

244. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, No. CRl1-2265-PhX-JAT-003, 2012 WL
5984796, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2012).

245. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24.
246. United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d
994,996-99 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th
Cir. 1999). The only circuit to hold otherwise was the D.C. Circuit. See United States
v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Additionally, some courts in the Eleventh Circuit have concluded that there was
binding precedent in their circuit on this issue prior to Jones. See United States v.
Barbary, No. 12-60011-CR, 2012 WL 4839127 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2012). These
courts point to the decision in United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.1981),
which allowed the installation of a beeper onto a car. See id. at 257-59. And because
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straightforward application of Davis, the fourteen post-Jones
decisions from these circuits considering the exclusion of GPS
tracking evidence have unanimously applied the good faith exception
and declined exclusion. 247
And while the picture gets somewhat more muddled in those
circuits where there was no binding precedent on GPS tracking preJones, the clear majority of decisions-thirteen-in those circuits
have also applied the good faith exception. 248 Indeed, even Antoine
Fifth Circuit decisions prior to the Eleventh Circuit's split from it constitute binding
precedent for the Eleventh Circuit, see Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (lith
Cir. 1981) (en banc), these courts hold that binding precedent existed in the Eleventh
Circuit on this issue sufficient to trigger Davis. However, because the beeper used in
Michael was more akin to the now-antiquated beepers considered in Karo and Knotts,
it is uncertain whether that stance will prevail. Accordingly, at the very least, we can
say with some level of certainty that the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had
binding precedent pre-Jones on this issue of GPS tracking.
247. United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 834 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Even assuming that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred and that suppression would otherwise be
appropriate, the evidence should not be suppressed in this case because the officers
acted in reasonable reliance on [then-existing] circuit precedent."); United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Orbegoso, No.
CR-II-02372, 2013 WL 161194, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2013) (same); United
States v. Guyton, No. 11-271,2013 WL 55837, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 3,2013) (same);
United States v. Villa, No. 10-30080, 2012 WL 535210,1 at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 31,
2012) (same); Brooks, 2012 WL 5984796 at *3 (same); United States v. Smith, No.
2:11-cr-00058-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 4898652, at *4-5 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2012)
(same); United States v. Hardrick, No. 10-202,2012 WL 4883666 (E.D. La. Oct. 15,
2012) (same); United States v. $22,361.83 U.S. Funds Seized from Various Accounts,
No. CV-1I-0317-EFS, 2012 WL 1884386, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 23, 2012) (same);
United States v. Aquilar, No. 4:1I-cr-298-BLW, 2012 WL 1600276, at *2 (D. Idaho
May 7, 2012) (same); United States v. Amaya, 853 F. Supp. 2d 818, 825-26 (N.D.
Iowa Apr. 10, 2012) (same); United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1191-93
(D. Haw. 2012) (same); United States v. Fata, No. 2:1I-cr-00188-RHL, 2012 WL
1715496, at *5-6 (D. Nev. Mar. 15,2012); United States v. Nwobi, No. CRlO-952(c)7,2012 WL 769746, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (same).
248. United States v. Fisher, No. 2:10-cr-28, 2013 WL 214379, at *2-3 (W.O. Mich. Jan.
18, 2013); United States v. Jones, No. 05-0386(ESH), 2012 WL 6443136, at *7-9
(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2012); United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, No. CRI1-S-424-S, 2012
WL 6186088, at *13-14 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11,2012) (rejecting the argument that there
must be explicit binding authority because "[s]uch cases strain at self-bred legal gnats
to reach a conclusion that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the exclusionary rule
require"); United Statesv. Ford, No. 1:1I-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *10-11 (E.D.
Tenn. Oct. 30,2012); United States v. Lewis, No. 12-600l1-CR, 2012 WL 4838889,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2012) ("This Court is aware of no case requiring the
Government to obtain a warrant based on the possibility that the Supreme Court might
in the future issue an opinion abrogating existing binding circuit precedent that did not

428

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Jones, who won the battle before the Supreme Court on certiorari,
lost the war below because the district court in his case held on
remand that the good faith exception permitted the introduction of the
GPS evidence against him.249 These decisions take stock of the legal
landscape as it existed when the warrantless GPS tracking was
engaged, and because at that time there were several circuit-level
decisions directly on point permitting warrantless GPS surveillance,
these courts have concluded that the good faith exception applies. 250
A minority of decisions-six-have opted, however, to read Davis
narrowly, and have held that absent binding precedent from their
circuit directly on point with regard to GPS surveillance, the good
faith exception cannot be applied.251 These decisions are principally
concerned with allowing law enforcement officers in circuits that do
not have controlling precedents to push the envelope by relying on
other circuits that favor their predilections. 252 However, as the Court

249.
250.

251.

252.

require one."); United States v. Rose, No. 11-10062-NMG, 2012 WL 4215868, at *35 (D. Mass. Sept.14, 2012); United States v. Lopez, 895 F. Supp. 2d 592, (D. Del.
2012); United States v. Barbary, No. 12-60011-CR, 2012 WL 4839127, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 6,2012); United States v. Oladosu, No. 1O-056-0IS, 2012 WL 3642851, at
*9-10 (D.R.1. Aug. 21,2012); United States v. Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d 288, 289 (D.
Mass. 2012) ("Where, as here, law enforcement officers at the time they act have a
good faith basis to rely upon a substantial consensus among precedential courts,
suppression of probative evidence is too high a price to pay because of the subsequent
supervention of that consensus by the Supreme Court."); United States v. Shelburne,
No. 3:11-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at *4-6 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2012); United
States v. Rosas-Illescas, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326-27 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Kelly v.
State, 208 Md. App. 218 (2012).
Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *7-9.
See, e.g., Figueroa-Cruz, 2012 WL 6186088, at *13-14 (holding that the good faith
exception applied to warrantless use of GPS tracker because while the agents were
tracking the defendant's car, "three Circuit Courts had expressly concluded that such
surveillance did not implicate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement").
United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571 (E.D. Ky. 2012) ("And because the
DEA agents did not rely on binding appellate precedent, the good-faith exception
cannot apply."); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540-42 (E.D. Pa. 2012);
United States v. Robinson, No. S2-4:IICR00036IAGF(DDN), 2012 WL 4893643
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2012) (declining to apply Davis because the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Marquez had not yet been decided when the warrantless GPS surveillance
was employed); State v. Henry, No. II-CR-829, 2012 WL 4859072, at *3 (Ohio
App. Oct. 12,2012); United States v. Lujan, No. 2:IICRII-SA, 2012 WL 2861546,
at *3 (N.D. Miss. July \1, 2012); United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL
1646894, at *7-10 (E.D. Pa. May 9,2012).
See, e.g., Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *7-10 (declining to permit law enforcement to
rely on "non-binding authority" to trigger the good faith exception in Davis because it
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in Ford aptly recognized/ 53 the government likely has the better of
the argument here under the strictures placed on the exclusionary rule
by the Supreme Court in Davis. 254 Specifically, the Court recognized
in Davis that exclusion is solely about deterrence where officers
engage in culpable conduct that violates sacrosanct rights. 255 By
contrast, exclusion is not merited where the conduct is not
culpable. 256 And as the court in Ford recognized, it is difficult to
describe an officer's action as culpable or deliberately reckless when
he or she relies on the legal pronouncements of a panel of three
circuit judges, notwithstanding that those judges are from outside the
officer's circuit. 257 To exact such a high price as exclusion in such a
situation seems disconnected from the level of culpability. This
calculus may likely be why the majority of lower courts apply the
good faith exception in post-Jones cases where GPS evidence was
obtained without a warrant.
In addition to the good faith exception, several post-Jones decisions
are applying the independent source exception to GPS tracking
data.258 This exception permits evidence to be introduced if it was
initially unlawfully seized, but later the same evidence was obtained
by leads based on independent information that was lawfully
obtained.259 Accordingly, in United States v. Patel/60 the Fifth
Circuit was confronted with a situation in which a whistleblower was
deemed to have become a government agent, and hence his
cooperation with obtaining evidence of the defendant's mobile
medical lab constituted an illegal search. 261 Rather than consider the
implications of Jones in this trespassory situation, the Court noted
that there was an independent source of information that provided the
fodder for the subsequent search warrant, which in tum meant
exclusion was not required. 262 Other decisions have also applied this

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

would incentivize officers to "beg forgiveness rather than ask permission
ambiguous situations involving basic civil rights").
See Ford, 2012 WL 5366049 at *10-11.
ld.
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-27.
ld.
See 2012 WL 5366049 at *10-11.
See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 538-39 (1988).
ld.
485 Fed. Appx. 702 (5th Cir. 2012).
ld. at 711.
ld.

In
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independent source exception to avoid applying Jones in a manner
that results in exclusion. 263
Other courts have applied the doctrine of inevitable discoverywhich is related intellectually to the independent source exceptionto penn it the introduction of warrantless GPS tracking data. For
example, in United States v. Orbegoso/64 the police placed a GPS
device on the bottom of the defendant's car and obtained information
on what banks he frequented as part of his currency smuggling
operation. 265 While the court held that the use of the GPS tracker
without a warrant was a violation, the court noted that the officers
were also conducting physical surveillance, and would have obtained
the same information by visual inspection as they received through
the GPS tracker. 266 As such, the court applied the inevitable
discovery rule and declined to exclude that evidence that the police
would have obtained even without the GPS device. 267 This result
coincides with a number of historical Fourth Amendment rulings.
Just as the court in Entick remarked that "the eye cannot ... be guilty
of trespass,,,268 and the Court in Brown permitted a flashlight to
enhance an officer's eyesight to peer into the interior of a car/69 so
too are some district courts holding that GPS technologies are
permitted under the inevitable discovery exception because the GPS
evidence simply enhances the police's ability to see what they would
otherwise be able to see with extended visual surveillance. 270 These
263. See, e.g., Hill v. Commonwealth, No. 1828-11-3, 2012 WL 4773583, at *2-3 (Va.

264.
265.
266.
267.

268.

269.
270.

App. Oct. 9, 2012) (applying the independent source exception with regard to GPS
tracking data obtained without a warrant).
See United States v. Orbegoso, No. CR-11-02372-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 161194 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 15,2013).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2-4.
Id. But see State v. Bone, No. 12-KA-34, 2012 WL 3968515, at *27 (La. App. Sept.
II, 2012) (holding that the inevitable discovery rule does not apply where the
investigating officer obtained a copy of text messages sent by defendant).
See Entick v. Carrington (1765), in 19 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 1029, 1066 (T.B. Howell Esq., comp.,
1813).
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983).
See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393-94 (D. Mass. 2010)
("Warrantless visual surveillance or 'tailing' of [suspect's] vehicle would have been
permissible and would have revealed to the FBI all of the same detail the GPS device
provided, only at a much higher cost .... ").
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precedents make the use of the inevitable discovery exception
uniquely applicable to GPS tracking evidence obtained without a
warrant.
Accordingly, district courts are applying a myriad of exceptions in
order to permit GPS information obtained without a warrant to
nonetheless still be admitted at trial and not excluded. This further
reinforces the notion that district courts are falling back on longestablished judicial precedents in a way that has kept Jones from
working any cataclysmic change in the year since it was decided.
The third major question that district courts are confronting with
regard to GPS evidence post-Jones is whether traditional standing
doctrines apply. As detailed above, the Supreme Court in Rakas v.
Illinois'2 71 recognized that Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and
cannot be asserted vicariously by individuals who lack an ownership
interest in the constitutionally-protected area that was invaded.272
And the majority opinion in Jones seemed to affirm this precedent by
going out of its way to mention that Jones held the status of a bailee
because he was the primary driver of his wife's car.273 Taking this
cue from the Court, all eleven district court decisions to reach the
issue have applied the bedrock standing rules from Rakas and
concluded that without owning, renting, or being the exclusive user
of the vehicle on which the GPS device was placed, that defendant
lacks standing to raise a Fourth Amendment suppression claim
because the search was of an area that was not constitutionally
protected as to him.274 This reaffmnation of the standing doctrine
271.
272.
273.
274.

See Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
ld. at 133-34.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 n.2 (2012).
United States v. Martinez-Turcio, No. 10-5046, 2012 WL 4054875, at *9 (4th Cir.
Sept. 17,2012); United States v. Shephard, No. 11-6037,2012 WL 3117513, at *5
(6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2012); United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, No. II-S-424-S, 2012 WL
6186088, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2012) ("Mr. Figueroa has likewise offered no
proof of exclusivity, indicia of ownership or even an unqualified permission to use the
[vehicle to which a tracking device was attached]."); United States v. Cannon, No.
6:11-cr-02302-JMC-l, 2012 WL 5386045, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2012); United
States v. Smith, No. 2:11-cr-00058-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 4898652, at *3 (D. Nev.
Oct. 15, 2012); Bad v. Heaney, No. 12-1589 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 3984550, at *1
(D. Minn. Sept. 11,2012); United States v. Lopez, No. lO-cr-67 (GMS), 2012 WL
3930317, at *5-6 (D. Del. Sept. 10,2012); United States v. Tan, No. CR 2:10-0262
WBS, 2012 WL 3535887, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15,2012); United States v. Ramos,
No. I: 11-cr-1 11-jgrn, 2012 WL 3307006, at*2 (D. Vt. Aug. 13,2012); United States
v. Coleman, No. 3:IO-cr-238, 2012 WL 3202957, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2012);
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subsequent to Jones is highly significant. This is because it will
permit law enforcement to engage in warrantless GPS data-collection
and use such evidence against a defendant, provided he lacks
standing to assert a violation of his personal rights. This rule allows
for ample use of GPS tracking to continue, even without a warrant,
depending on who the target is and whether he has a property-Iawbased interest in the area to be searched.
The fourth and fmal GPS-related question that district courts have
been called to rule on in the aftermath of Jones is whether the
decision applies retroactively. Patently, for cases on direct appeal,
the defendants can tum to Jones for assistance because a defendant
can invoke "[a] newly announced rule of substantive Fourth
Amendment law" until his "conviction ... become[s] final on direct
review.,,275 As such, any defendant on direct appeal may tum to
Jones for potential arguments. 276
A different approach applies, however, for defendants seeking
collateral review in federal court.277 The Supreme Court has held
that, as a general matter, "new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.,,278 Only in those cases
where (1) the new rule places certain individual conduct outside of
what was previously proscribed by criminal statute, or (2) where a
new rule fundamentally alters bedrock procedural elements, would a
court decision have retroactive effect. 279 Applying these criteria, all
ten court decisions to consider retroactivity have held that Jones is
not retroactive on collateral review. 280 This makes eminent sense in

275.
276.

277.
278.
279.
280.

United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1029 (D. Minn. 2012);
United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *7 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2012); United States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539, 547 (W.D. La.
2012); United States v. Hanna, No. 1I-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 30, 2012); State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 153 (Ariz. App. 2012).
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011).
See, e.g., State v. Bell, 366 S.W.3d 712, 713-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (granting
petition for discretionary review on direct appeal and remanding for consideration of
Jones).
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989); Bell, 366 S.W.3d at 713-14.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
Id. at 310-11.
United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-017-01, 2013 WL 312387, at *7 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 25, 2013); Connolly v. Roden, No. 09-11987-RWZ, 2013 WL 139702, at *2
n.3 (D. Mass. Jan. 11,2013); Reyes-Sotero v. United States, No. DKN 12-1036, DKC
08-0593,2012 WL 6681963, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012); Vazquez v. United States,
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that the Court's ruling on GPS tracking was about collection of
evidence of wrongdoing; it did not go the heart of decriminalizing an
act itself.281 In addition, the Jones decision simply indicated a search
occurred on the facts of that case; it did not create a new watershed
procedural rule that was applicable going forward. 282 Accordingly,
Jones has not been applied retroactively on collateral review, which
further limits its reach. 283
In sum, the various opinions in Jones raised a number of questions
with regard to evidence obtained from GPS tracking devices. 284 The
post-Jones decisions show district courts answering those questions
cautiously, and resorting to long-established judicial doctrines and
precedents. 285 Thus, while Jones did hold that installing and
monitoring a GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth
Amendment, it might not be an unconstitutional one if the monitoring
of the device was for a short, reasonable duration. 286 Likewise, even
if the GPS surveillance constituted an unconstitutional search, it still
might not lead to exclusion if the officers relied on then-existing

281.
282.
283.

284.
285.

286.

No. 2:09-cv-673-FtM-29SPC, 2:08-cr-FTM-29SPC, 2012 WL 5188027, at *7-8
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2012) ("The Jones decision did not recognize a new right, and
Jones has not been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.");
Pickett v. United States, No. 12-2239 (RBK), 2012 WL 5199142 at *2-3 (D.N.J. Oct.
18,2012); United States v. Reyes, No. 12CV555-MMA, 09CR2487-MMA, 2012 WL
4339070, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19,2012) ("Jones does not apply retroactively.");
Bad v. Heaney, No. 12-1589{DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 3984550 (D. Minn. Sept. 11,
2012); Garcia v. Bradt, No. 09CV7491{VB), 2012 WL 3027780, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July
23,2012); United States v. Heath, No. Cr 12-4-H-DWM, 2012 WL 1574123, at *1
(D. Mont. May 3, 2012) ("Unfortunately for Heath, the Jones decision is not
retroactive."); United States v. Walker, No. 09CR1533WQH, 12CV041OWQH, 2012
WL 666794, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29,2012).
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012).
See id.
See, e.g., Jesus-Nunez, 2013 WL 312387, at *7; Connolly, 2013 WL 139702, at *2
n.3; Reyes-Soters, 2012 WL 6681963, at *3; Vazquez, 2012 WL 5188027, at *7-8;
Pickett, 2012 WL 5199142, at *2-3; Reyes, 2012 WL 4339070, at *6-7; Bad, 2012
WL 3984550, at *1; GarCia, 2012 WL 3027780, at *5; Heath, 2012 WL 1574123, at
*1; Walker, 2012 WL 666794, at *2.
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 96162 (Alito, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Jesus-Nunez, 2013 WL 312387, at *7; Connolly, 2013 WL 139702, at *2
n.3; Reyes-Soters, 2012 WL 6681963, at *3; Vazgez, 2012 WL 5188027, at *7-8;
Pickett, 2012 WL 5199142, at *2-3; Reyes, 2012 WL 4339070, at *6-7; Bad, 2012
WL 3984550, at *1; Garcia, 2012 WL 3027780, at *5; Heath, 2012 WL 1574123, at
*1; Walker, 2012 WL 666794, at *2.
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
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precedent, or if the officers could have obtained the same evidence
through an independent source (such as physical, visual
surveillance).287 And defendants cannot even take advantage of Jones
if they lacked standing in the area that was monitored. 288 These lines
of authority all have the net result of limiting Jones's effect on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and certainly give some latitude for
warrantlessly-obtained GPS evidence to still come into play at tria1. 289
B.

Jones's Impact on the Use ofInformation Obtained from Other
New Technologies

While Jones involved the installation of a GPS tracking device to
the undercarriage of a vehicle, this has not stopped defendants from
attempting to apply the principles enunciated in Jones to other
technologies and situations. 29o Indeed, the dicta in some of the
concurrences in Jones seemed to invite attempts to reconsider a
number of longstanding principles as they applied to the Fourth
Amendment across a wide spectrum of evidence. 291 But as with the
tracking device cases described in Part III.A above, decisions in these
other areas also show courts moving cautiously, and declining to give
an expansive interpretation of Jones.292 Particularly, while lower
courts might be applying the property-law-focused test from Jones,
and while they might note the ideas floated in the concurrences of
Justices Sotomayor and Alito, courts have nonetheless deflected
many Jones-based Fourth Amendment challenges where law
enforcement obtained evidence emitted by new technologies. 293
Verily, Jones was significant for reviving a property-law-based test
for evaluating a potential Fourth Amendment violation. 294 Because

287. See id. at 953-54; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983).
288. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716, 719-20 (1984).
289. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; Karo, 468 U.S. at 716, 719-20; Knotts, 460 U.S. at
284-85.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (2012) (applying the
reasoning in Jones to suppress Cellular Phone Data and Historical Cell Site Location
Data).
291. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurrence); id. at
961-62 (Alito, 1., concurring).
292. See supra Part lILA.
293. See supra Part m.A.-B.
294. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
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there was a trespass to Mr. Jones's "effect," his car, the Court held a
search had occurred. 295
And trial courts have picked up on this "new" property-Iawfocused test and applied it to other new technologies. For example,
in State v. Bailey, the court there considered whether video
surveillance taken by the police somehow constituted a trespass onto
the defendant's land, and hence ran afoul of Jones. 296 The court
rejected this view because, in taking the video, "the police did not
touch [the defendant's] property, invade [his] private space, or follow
[him]'''297 Other lower and intennediate appellate courts have applied
property-law tests to new Fourth Amendment challenges as well. 298
So, at the very least, Jones has spawned an additional analytical step
in which courts must engage when evaluating a Fourth Amendment
Issue.
But simply applying these property-law tests to new technologies
has not meant that more evidence has been suppressed. In fact, in the
area of new technologies, courts have increasingly declined to hold
that virtual or electronic trespasses result in Fourth Amendment
violations. For example, in United States v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit
confronted the issue of evidence obtained from the defendant's payas-you-go cell phone that emitted a GPS signal that allowed the
location of the phone to be tracked. 299 In rejecting his challenge to
the evidence, the court relied on the fact that "[n]o such physical
intrusion occurred," and that the defendant himself obtained a phone
that already had a GPS tracker installed in it when it was
purchased. 30o In recognizing that the GPS device came pre-installed,
the case was in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Knotts,
which recognized that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred
295.
296.

See id.
See State v. Bailey, No. 009007758, 2012 WL 3655243, at *1 (De\. Super. July 20,

2012).
297. Jd.
298. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241 n.23 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying Jones's

property law analysis to the issue of whether police could search a seized shirt for
blood sample); United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 FJd 1179, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2012)
(applying property law concepts and holding that trespass into the curtilage meant it
was a search); Gilbert v. State, No. 58240,2012 WL 5378174, at *1-2 (Nev. Oct. 31,
2012) (applying property law concepts enunciated in Jones to surveillance of open
fields on ranch lands).
299. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2012).
300. Jd. at 780.
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when a tracking device was implanted by a third party prior to
purchase by the defendant. 30l This holding goes right to the point
made by Justice Alito in his concurrence in Jones in which he noted
that the majority's trespassory test would have little utility in the era
of smartphones, which already come equipped with GPS devices. 302
Accordingly, Skinner shows that because the Supreme Court's
decision in Jones turned on the initial trespass, its reach has been
muted in the area of smartphones, which already have GPS
technology and for which no trespass is needed to install the GPS
system. 303
A similar result has been reached with regard to the use of pole
camera surveillance. For instance, in United States v. Nowka,304 ATF
agents had a third-party utility company install a camera on the utility
pole immediately adjacent to the defendant's property.305 The camera
was trained on the defendant's driveway, and showed him placing
several firearms into his car, which evidence was later used to obtain
a search warrant in an investigation into unlicensed firearms sales. 306
In rejecting the defendant's motion to suppress based on Jones, the
court recognized that "there was no physical trespass when the
camera was attached to the pole," and the camera only showed
images that anyone could see standing on the sidewalk, and hence the
camera evidence was not unlawfully obtained. 307 Similar results were
reached in United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw,308 and United States
v. Brooks. 309 In both cases, the courts rejected challenges to pole
cameras that had been installed adjacent to where the defendants

301. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279-80 (1983).
302. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-63 (2012).
303. But see Commonwealth v. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095 at *6-10 (Mass.
Super. Feb. 23, 2012) (holding that even though smartphone contained a GPS tracker,
obtaining defendant's location information still required a warrant because the
technology provides "a window into the most private dimensions of [our] lives").
304. United States v. Nowka, No. 5:11-cr-00474-VEH-HGD, 2012 WL 2862139, at *4
(N.D. Ala. May 14,2012).
305. Jd. at *4-5.
306. See id.
307. ld. at *4.
308. United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, No. 1:11-CR-257, 2012 WL 774964 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 8, 2012).
309. United States v. Brooks, No. CR-1l-2265-PHX-JAT--003, 2012 WL 5984804 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 28, 2012).
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lived because no trespass had occurred during the installation. 310
However, what is significant here is that these courts also considered
arguments made by the defendants that echoed the arguments by
Justices Sotomayor and Alito that, at some point, 2417 surveillance
might be so pervasive that it triggers Fourth Amendment concems.3l1
Emblematic of the caution being taken by district courts in this area,
both courts declined to read the tea leaves about what the Court might
do in a future case based on the dicta in the concurrences.3I2 As such,
just like smartphone GPS tracking, the questions raised in Jones have
not resulted in pole camera evidence being suppressed so far.
Likewise, district courts have continued to uphold investigative
techniques where agents access peer-to-peer network shared files. 313
For example, in United States v. Brooks,3J4 the defendant had a closed
peer-to-peer file-sharing network set up, which allowed him to accept
"friend" requests and share files from his network with those friends
to whom he allowed access.315 After he accepted a friend request
from an undercover agent, the agent was able to access certain files
on the defendant's network that contained child pomography.3J6 In
the defendant's motion to suppress, he raised Jones and held that the
agent committed an electronic trespass to his network files.317 The
court rejected this argument and held that "'merely the transmission
of electronic signals'" did not result in an unlawful trespass. 318 At
least one other court has reached a similar result and rejected the
argument that an undercover agent commits a virtual trespass by

310. Brooks, 2012 WL 5984804, at *1, *4-7; Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 WL 774964, at *1,
*3.
311. See Brooks, 2012 WL 5984804, at *4-6 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
962-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)); Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 WL 774964, at *2.
312. Brooks, 2012 WL 5984804, at *5-6; Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 WL 774964, at *2.
313. See United States v. Brooks, No. 12-CR-166 (RRM), 2012 WL 6562947 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17,2012); United States v. Nolan, No. I:IICR 82 CEl., 2012 WL 1192183, at
*10-11 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (Report and Recommendation), adopted by United
States v. Nolan, no. l:ll-CR-82 CEJ, 2012 WL 1192757, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9,
2012).
314. 2012 WL 6562947.
315. Id.at*1.
316. Id.
317. Id. at *1-2, 5.
318. Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Jones, S. Ct. 945,953 (2012)).
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accessing files on a peer-to-peer network to which he was gIVen
access by the defendant. 3\9
In a similar vein, courts have declined to suppress evidence
obtained by the use of electronic "key fobs.,,320 Key fobs are
electronic devices that send a signal to a particular vehicle and allow
the vehicle to be unlocked or to set off the car's theft alarm.321 In
United States v. Cowan,322 officers executed a search warrant on the
defendant's home, and during a protective pat-down they felt a set of
keys and a key fob in the defendant's pocket. 323 The officers
subsequently pressed the alann button on the key fob in order to
determine if the defendant's vehicle was located outside. 324 In
rejecting the defendant's suppression argument, the court declined to
hold that merely sending the electronic signals from the fob resulted
in a trespass to the vehicle. 325 A similar result was reached in Nunley
v. State in which an officer pressed a key fob's remote door-lock
button: the court held that "[t]he act of transmitting the electronic
signal from the key to the car did not constitute a trespass.,,326 These
and other cases involving key fobs show courts declining to extend
Jones's trespassory test to the extreme and to the virtual. 327 Rather,
these courts recognize that electronic "trespasses" using key fobs
should not automatically result in suppression. 328

319.
320.

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

326.
327.

328.

Nolan, 2012 WL 1192183 at * 10-11, adopted by United States v. Nolan, No. 1:11CR-82 CEl, 2012 WL 1192757, at * I (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9,2012).
See United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 952-57 (8th Cir. 2012); Nunley v. State,
No. 05-11-01066-CR, 2012 WL 6035512, at *2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2012);
Wiley v. State, No. 01-11-00147-CR, 2012 WL 3773293, at *9-10 (Tex. Ct. App.
Aug. 30,2012).
Cowan, 674 F.3d at 951; Wiley, 2012 WL 3773293, at *9.
United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 951.
/d.
[d. at 955-57. Alternatively, the court held that even if the use of the fob was a
search, it was justified by the automobile exception. [d.
Nunley v. State, 2012 WL 6035512 at *2-3.
See, e.g., Wiley v. State, No. 01-ll-00157-CR, 2012 WL 3773293 at *9-10 (Tex.
App. Aug. 30, 2012) (holding that use of car alarm button did not violate defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights).
See supra notes 322-327.
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Wireless networks provide an additional example of where courts
are being asked to outline the limits of Jones. 329 Wireless network
routers emit radio signals that permit a user in one's home or business
to access the internet without requiring the computer to be physically
attached to an ethernet cable and cable router. 330 While these systems
are convenient, they have the downside of being vulnerable to
hackers and intrusion from the outside. 331 In addition, as a simple
factual matter, the networks often broadcast radio signals that
broadcast to everyone in the vicinity that the user has a wireless
network set Up.332 This dynamic came to a head in United States v.
Ahrndt. 333 In that case, a neighbor of the defendant obtained access to
the internet through the defendant's nearby wireless connection. 334
However, when the neighbor did so, the neighbor got access to a
shared library the defendant had created on iTunes, which contained
images of child pornography.335 After the neighbor alerted police, an
officer asked the neighbor to repeat for him how the neighbor
accessed the defendant's network, which in tum led the officer to
obtain a search warrant. 336 In denying the defendant's motion to
suppress, the district court held that by using a wireless network that
was unsecured, the defendant had essentially broadcast his files to
anyone in the public who might care to see. 337 In reaching this
decision, the court was echoing the holding in Olmstead that the use
of telephone lines had the result of magnifying one's voice to the
outside world. 338 While the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
329.

330.
33 J.

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See Wi-Fi, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2013), available at
http://
www.britannica.comlEBcheckeditopicI1473553IWi-Fi (explaining how wireless
networks function).
See WLAN, in Glossary, WI-FI ALLIANCE, http://www.wi-fi.orglknowledge-center/
glossary (last visited May 23,2013).
See Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud:
Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359,
373-75 (2010).
See supra notes 329-30.
United States v. Ahrndt, 475 Fed. App'x. 656 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-Kl, 2010 WL 373994, at *5 (D. Or. Jan 28,
2010) rev'd, 475 F. App'x 656 (9th Cir. 2012).
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overroled by Katz v.
United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)
("The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
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further fact-finding,339 the decision shows once again that lower
courts are not employing Jones to suppress evidence based on the
electronic or virtual trespasses.
What undergirds these decisions is the long-established third-party
doctrine recognized in United States v. Miller. 340 This doctrine holds
that individuals lose a reasonable expectation in privacy information
they voluntarily share with a third-party who may give that
information up to the government. 341 And notwithstanding the fact
that Justice Sotomayor in Jones suggested that it might be time to
reassess the validity of the third-party doctrine in this electronic age
of data-sharing with third parties,342 numerous post-Jones decisions
have applied the third-party doctrine to permit law enforcement to
obtain historical cell phone location data,343 text messages,344
tweets/ 45 and telephone numbers dialed and calls received346 because
they all were shared with third-party communication providers in
transmISSIon.
In reaching these decisions, these courts have
recognized Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, but have concluded that
"Justice Sotomayor's potential willingness to reconsider the third
party doctrine says very little about how the Supreme Court as a

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

344.

345.

346.

with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the
wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.").
475 Fed. App'x. at 658.
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 443.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384,398-403 (D. Md. 2012) (declining
to reconsider third-party doctrine where agents had sought historical cell phone
location data because "unless and until the Supreme Court affirmatively revisits the
third-party doctrine the law is [still the same under Miller],,). Accord United States v.
Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8-10 & n.1O (S.D. Fla. July 30,
2012).
State v. Roden, 279 P.3d 461,464-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). But see State v. Patino,
No. PI-IO-1155A, 2012 WL 3886269 (Super. Ct. R.I. Sept. 4, 2012) (holding that
defendant retained privacy interest in text messages); Roden, 279 P.3d at 472-74 (Van
Deren, J., dissenting) (stating that third-party doctrine should not apply given the
reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages).
People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593-96 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (rejecting
defendant's reliance on Justice Sotomayor's concurrence and holding that tweets
constitute "[P]ublication to third parties," and hence there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy).
United States v. Gomez, No. 10-321, 2012 WL 3844370, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5,
2012).
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whole would view such a challenge, and certainly does not give a
district court much comfort in making a decision that would directly
conflict with long-established Supreme Court precedent.,,347 This
stance is emblematic of the caution with which district courts have
approached these issues involving new technologies.
So, while Jones raised a number of questions that defendants have
used to mount challenges to evidence collected by law enforcement
from the use of new technologies, subsequent decision-making has
not led to widespread or even consistent suppression. Perhaps as a
result of the fact that the majority in Jones rested on a trespass-based
theory and not upon any of the more far-reaching notions mentioned
in the two concurrences, district courts have largely declined to break
new Fourth Amendment ground where novel technologies are
concerned.
These courts have declined to give expansive
interpretations to Jones by declining to hold that every virtual or
electronic intrusion into a new technology might be a "trespass" that
results in a search. 348 Likewise, these courts have continued to apply
the third-party doctrine enunciated in Miller. 349 And as a result, the
post-Jones Fourth Amendment jurisprudence looks much the same as
it did before.
C.

Jones's Impact on the Fourth Amendment Generally

As detailed above, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Jones, there was much anticipation that the Court might embrace the
mosaic theory suggested by the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Maynard. 350 And between the concurrences of Justices Sotomayor
and Alito, it appears that five Justices might be open to such a new
rule. 351 However, while raising the question, a majority of the Court
did not decide it.
And as with the other questions raised by Jones, district courts have
declined to adopt such an understanding in the absence of a more
defmitive embrace by a majority of the Court. For example, in
United States v. Graham, the court recognized that the Jones majority
did not reach the issue of the mosaic theory.352 The court furthermore
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id.
See supra notes 292-339.
See supra notes 125-132,342-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md. 2012).
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noted the "problematic" consequences of adopting a mosaic theory
test, including how it would penalize law enforcement for being
thorough and engaging in infonnation-gathering techniques, which
would be permissible in isolation. 353 After considering the difficulties
involved with applying such a theory, the district court in Graham
held that "[u ]ntil the Supreme Court or the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit defmitively conclude that an
aggregation of surveillance records infringes a Fourth Amendment
legitimate expectation of privacy, this Court must apply the facts of
this case to the law as currently interpreted.,,354 A number of other
district courts have followed suit and declined to adopt a mosaic
theory approach to the Fourth Amendment. 355
Accordingly, the Jones decision has not ushered in a general
realignment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least not yet.
Perhaps such a realignment in the area of emerging technologies will
have to wait for legislative action. Specifically, in his concurrence,
Justice Alito suggested that legislation in this area would be merited
and perhaps the best way forward. 356 At least one district court has
joined in that call, by stating that "if the arc of technological
improvement (or the implementation of that technology by the
government) should be altered in a way that does infringe a person's
legitimate expectation of privacy, the solution is properly for the
legislature to address.,,357 And it would not be unprecedented for the
legislature to take such action. 358 After the Court decided Olmstead,
Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934. 359

353. Id. at 401--03.
354. Id. at 394.
355. United States v. Brooks, No. CR 11-2265-PHX-JAT-003, 2012 WL 5984804, at *5-6
(D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2012) (declining to adopt mosaic theory); United States v.
Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI, 2012 WL 5208173, at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 22, 2012)
(applying the standard enunciated in Smith); United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, No.
l:ll-CR-257, 2012 WL 774964, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2012). But see
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *7 (Mass. Super.
Aug. 7, 2012) (suggesting the mosaic theory should apply with regard to historical
cell data); Montana State Fund v. Simms, 270 P.3d 64, 69-70 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson,
J., specially concurring) (suggesting that the mosaic theory should apply to public
camera surveillance).
356. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
357. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
358. See supra notes 103-105, 124 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, after the Katz decision, Congress passed Title III. 360 What
this history has shown is that when Congress acts in this manner, it
sets clear ground rules that law enforcement can understand and
follow, and that courts can easily apply. And given that Congress is
accountable to the people through the democratic processes, any
legislation passed should likely have popular legitimacy, and be
subject to further amendment should the need arise.
So, it remains to be seen whether the mosaic theory will ever get a
definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, or whether the Court
desires to usher in a new paradigm when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, at least for now, any realignment of the Fourth
Amendment and its protections in the area of new technologies may
have to come from the federal and state legislatures and not from the
courts.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment protects some of our most important and
sacrosanct rights as American citizens. As a Nation, we were born
out of a search for liberty, freedom, and independence from the
British Crown. In reaction to the abuses of general warrants and
writs of assistance, the Framers adopted a Fourth Amendment that
guaranteed each of us certain rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. And while the Supreme Court has continued to
safeguard these rights amidst advancing technologies-from the
advent of the telephone, to the invention of the flashlight, to the use
of thermal imagers, and now to the use of GPS trackers-new
challenges have arisen with regard to how we understand and apply
the Fourth Amendment to modem times.
Jones represented an opportunity for the Court to make a farreaching change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. But instead of
fundamentally making new constitutional ground, the Court in Jones
revived a property-law-based approach to the Fourth Amendment,
and grafted a new/old test onto the Katz test that had reigned for the
past thirty years. But while the Court revived property-law theory to
fmd there was a search, it did not decide much else. In fact, while a
number of Justices suggested they would be ready to reconsider
certain bedrock principles, they declined to do so as a majority in
Jones.
360. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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As a result, district courts left to answer the issues raised by the
various opinions in Jones have responded with caution. Rather than
fly headlong into uncharted territory, district court have applied longstanding precedents to deal with the new challenges raised by new
technologies. Consequently, while Jones might signal changes on the
horizon, a year's worth of post-Jones data shows that widespread
change has not yet come. Thus, while Jones might not have been the
harbinger of change it was hyped to be, it will take a future case to
see if it was the start of a wholly new chapter in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.

